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Sarah Wessel
 
Introduction: The Legitimate, Illegitimate
Parliamentary Elections1 
1 On 1st of October 2011, seven weeks before the parliamentary elections, the military chief
of staff, Sami Enan, met members of the Democratic Coalition2.  The meeting was held
hours after scuffles broke out in Tahrir Square. The outcome was an agreement on a new
election law to allow political parties to field candidates in the one-third of seats that had
previously been reserved for independent candidates3. This agreement was welcomed by
many political  parties  and other  groups4,  5,  6.  On  21st  of  January  the  results  of  the
parliamentary elections were announced and the Carter Centre stated after its election
witnessing mission: “(...) the results appear to be a broadly accurate expression of the will
of the voters”7.  Nevertheless a few days after the first gathering of the newly elected
parliament, thousands of Egyptians were demonstrating in front of the Television Towers
of Maspero and on Midan Tahrir.  The following slogans were chanted over and over
again: “If here is someone from the Muslim Brotherhood, then he should leave right now.
We do not want you here”. The parliament operated for a few months only: On the 14th of
June 2012, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) ruled that the amendments to the
election law were not legal. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) dissolved
the  parliament  and  assumed  the  responsibilities  until  a  new  one  is  elected8.  Many
considered this as a Military soft coup9. To date (March 2013) a replacement parliament is
yet to be elected. 
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2 These related scenarios are difficult to explain with most theories that deal with political
representation: Theories on political representation usually focus on elections to explain
the legitimacy of representatives by equating political representation with democratic
representation10. Elections are here usually understood as a kind of ritual, which creates
the legitimacy of the representatives and reproduces democracy. Taking this equation for
granted, the explanation for the given scenario could be that Egypt is in a transformation
process  in  which  procedures  like  the  elections  can  be  free  and  fair  and  therefore
legitimate, but that authoritarian power relations, structures and institutions are still in
existence and too influential to have a “real democracy”. At the first glance, this might
not  be  wrong  to  state.  However,  this  explanation  assumes  that  democratic  and
authoritarian structures are two independent “systems” that are divided and competing,
but not interrelated.
3 Starting  from  the  assumption,  that  legitimacy  is  the  product  of  the  static  facts  of
elections,  the  complex  changes  and  interlinked  developments  concerning  political
representation  and  legitimacy  cannot  be  explained.  Like  the  initially  given  scenario
indicates, in times of transformation, in which the constitution is contested, in which
elections might not be considered as being representative, in which institutions as the
High Court are considered from many Egyptians as being from the “old regime” and
therefore not legitimate - the construction or the making of representation and even the
making of legitimacy is much more controversial and dynamic. 
4 In  this  paper  I  will  argue,  that  we  have  to  overcome  the  implicit  division  between
“democratic”  and  “authoritarian  systems”  in  order  to  analyse  the  controversial  and
dynamic construction of representation and the making of legitimacy in Egypt in a period
of  transformation.  Therefore I  will  first  present  a theory on political  representation,
which focuses on the practices of politics and is more empirical driven instead of using a
normative  approach11.  Consequently,  I  will  show  how  legitimacy  is  negotiated  and
renegotiated during the parliamentary elections 2011/2012 in Egypt. On the one hand I
hope to  contribute  to  the  new theoretical  approaches  on political  representation by
trying  to  adapt  them.  I  also  try  to  make  sense  of  different  interrelated  events  and
scenarios during the parliamentary elections and the transformation process in Egypt in
general, that often seem confusing at a first glance. On the other hand I hope to foster a
discussion about normative driven theories and their impacts: Approaching legitimate
political  representation from an empirical  point  of  view might  enable  a  more dense
analysis of political practices and shed light on more subtle authoritarian structures and
decision-making processes that are also part of every democracy.
 
Political Representation, Legitimacy and Claims
5 Michael Saward looks at political representation through the lens of representative claims
12.  Like  Nancy  Schwartz13 or  Andrew  Rehfeld,  he  approaches  legitimate  political
representation from an empirical perspective. Rehfeld argues: “political representation
has a robust non-normative descriptive sense, that is, it describes facts about the political
world without necessarily appealing to normative standards of legitimacy or justice”14.
6 Saward understands political representation as a multisided process of claim-making and
the reception and the judgment of the claims15. Starting from this approach, democratic
elections can only be considered as a snap shot that shows the acceptance of certain
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claims at a certain moment. The process of making claims and receiving claims starts
before the elections and continues after the elections. This approach stresses a new way
of looking at political representation with a focus on the interplays and reciprocal effects
between different actors or groups - on the ways would - be representatives make their
claims,  how  they  frame  them,  and  how  these  claims  are  received  and  accepted.
Consequently, legitimacy is here understood as acceptance of people and groups, which is
changing over time and can be institutionalized in different ways, depending on current
conditions16.
7 Using this approach raises the following questions: How are claims made and received
before, during and in the aftermath of elections? From which groups of people are they
accepted or rejected and why? What are the interplays and reciprocal effects between the
claim-making and the claim-receiving? Where can we identify ruptures/changes or even
contradictions of claim-making and claim-receiving? How can these be explained? 
8 In order to answer these questions I will focus on the claim-making and claim-receiving
of the four coalitions that were established during the election process in Egypt: The
Democratic  Alliance  (led  by  the  Freedom  and  Justice  Party  from  the  Muslim
Brotherhood),  the Egyptian Bloc (led by the Party of  the Free Egyptians,  the Islamic
Coalition (led by the Party of Light from the Salafis) and the Alliance to Complete the
Revolution (led by the Social Alliance Party)17.
 
Claim-Making Strategies of Parties and Claim-
Receiving
9 It is obvious that financial resources and the organizational structure of parties play a
crucial role to bring the claims to the public, to get access to a broad audience. The four
coalitions were led by the parties with the biggest amount of financial resources and
therefore had better  chances  to win more seats  in the elections18. The financial  and
organizational discrepancy between the coalitions was immense. This discrepancy was
also reflected in the streets: While the Democratic Alliance with the Freedom and Justice
Party strongly dominated the streets in Cairo with its banners and posters, the Alliance of
Completing the Revolution hardly could afford to hang up banners and posters, probably
also due to the lack in their organizational structure. The Party of the Free Egyptians,
which was founded by the billionaire Naguib Sawiris19 instead, was one of the first that
started  their  election  campaign  by  putting  huge  advertisings  at  exposed  sites  as
skyscrapers and highways20. 
10 Besides the financial and organizational sources that enable the parties and enhances
their possibilities to bring their claims forward, the question of how the parties render
their claims is crucial to understand how the impression of presence was created. I will
give now three examples of the reciprocity between claim-making and claim-receiving
that are embedded in certain discourses and frames: The revolution frame, the religion
frame and the discourse about legitimacy itself, elaborating on the scenario given in the
introduction. 
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The Revolution-Frame: Catch the fulul
11 Since January 2011 the “revolution” became a constant, which was used as benchmark to
assess would-be representatives. During the parliamentary election every candidate who
claimed to be a future legitimate representative therefore had to refer somehow to the
revolution and how he/she was participating in it. Someone, who was in the old system of
Mubarak,  had  to  explain  how he  or  she  supported  the  revolution  much  more  than
someone, who was not in the old system, in order to show that he is following new ideas
that are associated with the revolution. Different campaigns against the fulul,  the so-
called remnants of the old regime, appeared. Youth movements spread lists with names
of the fulul and started the initiative “Catch the fulul”21. 
12 Consequently, the history of a party and its members and which role they played in the
past  and during the political  upheavals  was strongly shaping their  claims.  While the
earlier  opposition  parties,  like  the  Wafd  Party,  were  considered  from  most  of  my
informants as part of the regime while the religious parties, the Party of Light and the
Freedom and Justice Party, my informants referred to as the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Salafis, were mainly considered as the real opposition to the “Mubarak-system”. 
13 For the liberal parties it seemed to be much more difficult to gain acceptance from the
people - even when they were not considered as fulul - for mainly three reasons: (1) The
concept of liberalism was not easy to understand, (2) the names of the parties sounded
very similar, what confused people, and (3) they did not have a past as a “real” opposition
during Mubarak time in the eyes of many people. This was one of the main reasons, why
they built their campaigns around famous figures in Egypt that are well known for a long
time and had a past as Naguib Sawiris, Anwar Sadat, Muhammad al-Sawy, Amr Hamzawy.
Anwar Sadat stated: “The people do not care very much about programs. People are more
interested in persons than in political parties. People vote the people they know. This is
why I am promoting my name and my party is behind me”22. This also explains why the
liberal parties,  although they had almost all  a similar program did not make one big
party: they were depending on creating a past through famous individuals that could be
considered as anti-fulul23.
14 The discourse about fulul deeply influenced the procedures of the elections. It was mainly
due to the fear that former members of the resolved National Democratic Party could win
many votes of the one-third of seats that had been reserved for independent candidates
that led to the negotiations of the political parties with the SCAF and to the amendments
of the election law as mentioned above24, 25. The parties and several activists hoped that
the amendments would lower the chances of the fulul to win seats in the elections26. To
summarize: Only because the discourse about the fulul was so present and strong amongst
the population, it could be used to legitimize claims that finally changed the election law.
 
The Religious Frame: When acceptance becomes visible
15 A first turning point considering religious discourses was 29th of July when demonstration
on Midan Tahrir started, in which mainly supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Salafis  participated,  while secular political  groups and movements disappeared27. The
collective(s) had been there before, but it was the first time that it raised a claim in the
public. It made the religious movements and supporters visible and it became clear, that
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they would play an important role in politics. Many people were completely surprised by
the big amount of Muslim Brotherhood and especially Salafi supporters. Ayman, 30, who
accompanied me to the demonstrations turned out to be completely surprised by the
huge number of Salafis we recognized there around 3 pm. “I was not aware that we have
Salafis in Egypt at all, and now look at this”, he said28. We were standing in front of a
stage, where some few members of secular groups, that had decided to stay on Tahrir,
held the Koran in the air, to show the approaching group of Salafis, that also for them
Islam and religion is meaningful. The big group of Salafis shouted “Islamiya, Islamiya”,
meaning that they want an Islamic State. The atmosphere became more and more tense.
The last few members of the secular groups decided to leave. We left Tahrir and realized
dozens of busses around Tahrir,  in which mainly Salafis were sleeping inside. Ayman
explained to me that the busses brought the demonstrators from the villages and other
cities to Tahrir, what indicates that they were very well organized.
16 Until this day the narrative of a secular and liberal youth revolution was prevalent29.
Since the demonstrations the presented discourses in the media and the statements of my
interview  partners  changed:  The  question  of  the  role  of  Islam  within  a  democracy
increased tremendously. Many of my interview partners stated that they have to think
anew about the role of the Islam in politics. Some of them, who were in favour of an
islamistic state started to question this  idea,  since they realized that  there might be
religious political groups, that were too extreme from their point of view, but could be a
crucial force in shaping the changing state institutions and structures. 
17 A second turning point was the demonstrations on Maspero of mainly Coptic people that
were violently turned down on 9th of October. They stipulated the discussion about the
relation between Muslims and Christians in Egypt. The day of Maspero, Mustafa (30) and
Sherif (35) went with me to the Tahrir Lounge, a cultural centre close to Midan Tahrir and
around half a mile away from the Television buildings of Maspero to a presentation from
the Costa Salafi, the youth group of the Salafis. During the presentation we heard loud
noises from outside and we got instructions that on our way home we should avoid the
6th  of  October  bridge,  because  they  were  violent  demonstrations  in  front  of  the
Television building. We left around 10 pm and asked people what had happened. We got
involved in several discussions, mainly with men between 30 and 40. In all the discussions
the  men said:  There  are  Christians  demonstrating  at  Maspero.  There  is  gunfire  and
violence. What do they want? We always lived together and there were never problems
between Muslims and Christians’30.
18 The discourses on the relation between Muslims and Christians and the role of Islam in
politics were reflected in the election campaigns from the parties. Many parties framed
their campaigns in terms of Islamic religion. This was not surprising for the Freedom and
Justice Party, which used slogans like “Islam is the solution”31 on banners and posters or
the Party of Light, even when this was officially forbidden32. But also many secular parties
framed their election campaigning events in religious terms,  although they explicitly
opposed raising religious slogans33. An interesting example is the Egyptian Bloc, which is
led by the Party of  the Free Egyptians,  founded by the Coptic  Naguib Sawiris34. The
election campaign event of the Egyptian Bloc that was held in Mahalla al-Kubra on 9th of
December 2011 started with a Quran recitation from the Imam, which took around twenty
minutes.  After  the  Quran recitation the  shabab  al-thaura was  praised  and a  minute’s
silence  was  made  in  commemoration  of  the  martyrs  of  the  revolution.  Then the
politicians held their speeches. After every speech a moderator was explaining how the
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speech was related to Islam. Also a Sheikh was holding a speech, in which he stated that
the coalition is  not  anti-religious.  Some speakers  quoted newspaper articles  of  other
Sheikhs and Imams who were emphasizing that it is not haram (religiously forbidden) to
vote for the Egyptian Bloc35.
19 Competing  with  other  religious  parties  that  obviously  had  a  lot  of  supporters  the
Egyptian  Bloc  tried  to  fix  their  reputation  as  “secular”,  but  “Christian”  party.  They
needed to show that especially Islam plays an outstanding role for them. By doing so they
could also position themselves as party, which is following religious ideas, but might not
be as “extreme” in their religious thinking as other parties. 
20 It was a crucial question from many of my interview partners, if they as Muslims could
vote for a secular party and was founded by a Christian. Several of my Muslim interview
partners that voted for them because they were “in favour of a secular state” told me
about their experiences in the polling stations in Cairo Downtown: Manal (31) stated: “I
went to the polling station and asked the people outside and inside whom they are voting
for. All of them answered: The Muslim Brotherhood. When I started to discuss with them
and told them that I vote the Egyptian Bloc, they asked me, if I am not Muslim”36.
21 According to these examples,  religion seemed to play an outstanding role in gaining
acceptance from the people. Otherwise the Egyptian Bloc could just have outlined its idea
of liberalism and secularism and there would not have been the need to render the whole
event mainly in terms of Islamic religion. Also the reactions to Manal and the others
would have been different.  I  want  to  stress  that  also  many of  my Muslim interview
partners finally voted for the Egyptian Bloc, not necessarily because they were in favour
of a secular state, but because they considered the prevalent religious political parties as
too extreme concerning their religious ideas.  Consequently,  the — mainly due to the
Maspero-incident and the appearance of new Islamic collectives and parties — changing
discourses on Islam deeply influenced the voting decision of my interview partners. 
 
Competitive claims from demonstrators during the parliamentary
elections: Legitimate or illegitimate elections?
22 On the 18th November 2011, a few days before the first election round, demonstrations on
Midan Tahrir and in other parts of Egypt began37. Two main demands seemed to dominate
the  demonstrations:  The  withdrawal  of  the  controversial  constitutional  principles
proposed by Deputy Prime Minister Ali El-Selmy38 and the handover of power of the SCAF
to  civilian  rule  no  later  than  April  201239.  They  culminated  in  violence  mainly  on
Muhammad Mahmoud Street and led to a big number of people that intended to boycott
the elections: “How do you want me to vote, when the parliament will have no powers if
the military is still in charge?” said one of the protesters Mustafa Shaath (30)40. The trust
of  people  in  the  SCAF  that  had  already  suffered  immensely  due  to  its  reactions  on
Maspero steadily decreased during the demonstrations, because of the violence against
the demonstrator on Muhammad Mahmoud Street. 
23 I was surprised that also many of my political active interview partners disqualified the
protests  on Tahrir.  Heba (26),  who is  organizing public  events  for  different  political
groups, just came back from talks with demonstrators on Muhammad Mahmoud Street,
when she stated: “I do not understand what is going on at the moment. The people on
Tahrir  this  is  not  shabab al-thaura.  I  think this  is  baltageya (“thugs”).  This  is  not  the
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revolution. We did our revolution in January. I am so confused. But we need the elections
now41”.
24 Menna  (26),  who  witnessed  from  the  AUC  building  the  incidents  on  Muhammad
Mahmoud Street, agreed with the protests. She said: “You know, most of my friends are
supporting the Military Council. But after what happened in Muhammad Mahmoud I told
them: If you do not understand what is going on at the moment, then we cannot be
friends anymore. On Muhammad Mahmoud youth is fighting against the SCAF and they
are better youth then you or me”42. She expressed that she considers the constitution is
illegal and considered the Military council as not being the legitimate representative. 
25 It is interesting to state that two different informants that talked to demonstrators on
Muhammad Mahmoud labelled them in opposing ways: as the “real shabab al-thaura” and
as the opposite from it, as baltageya. Also many of my other interview partners were using
the signifier shabab al-thaura or baltageya to legitimize or delegitimize the protests. 
26 The  parties  and  the  Military  council  had  to  react  to  these  competing  claims.  They
profoundly  contested  their  role  as  current  or  future  legitimate  representatives.  The
parties suddenly did not only have to explain why they as a particular party would be
good representatives compared to the other parties. They had to make a stand regarding
the legal frame, the constitution and also to the revolution in order to show that their
future role as representatives would be legitimated. By participating in the elections the
parties  and coalitions implicitly  agreed on the legal  frame and they were facing the
problem, that they could have been considered as not real revolutionaries in the eyes of
people.
Parties (implicit claims) Demonstrators (explicit claims)
Recognizing the legal frame (constitution) Not recognizing the legal frame (constitution)
Military  Council  is  the  legitimate
representative 
Military  council  is  not  legitimate
representative
Elections will represent the people Elections will not represent the people
27 It was particular difficult for the Completing the Revolution Alliance43 to react to the
demonstrators. The Coalition was made up in October in order to bring the “Voices of
Tahrir and the revolutionary Youth to the Parliament”44. So the coalition had to prove 
that they listen to the voices of the Tahrir that were mainly refusing the legal frame. At
the same time it was still accepting the legal frame. Amr Hamzawy as the most prominent
member of the coalition stopped his official election campaigning for a while in order to
show  his  support  for  the  demonstrations  and  then  turned  back  to  his  campaign45.
Stopping his campaign was part of his campaign. 
28 The Muslim Brotherhood followed a different strategy: They avoided participating in the
demonstrations on Midan Tahrir. In order to show that they are a kind of revolutionaries
they made other demonstrations for the rights of the Palestinian people46.
29 Also the reaction of the Military council was interesting: On the one hand the Military
council  said  during  the  uprisings  in  November,  that  it  has  to  fight  against  the
demonstrations in order to defend the election process. After the elections the SCAF said
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that the parliament in this way is not representative enough when it comes to write the
constitution47. 
30 It was not sure until the day of the elections, if they will take place at all. When 52% from
the eligible voters dropped their voice in the ballot box there was no discussion at all
about  the  question,  if  the  parliament  could  be  declared  as  illegitimate  due  to  the
amendments of the law that the SCAF had agreed on due to the pressure of the parties
and demonstrating groups. When the parliament was dissolved from the SCAF, it was not
clear if the member of the parliaments would accept this decision and when the recently
elected president Muhammad Mursi decided to hold a meeting in the parliament48 after
its declared dissolve, it was completely unclear to the public how this meeting would end:
As a counter-coup against the SCAF, declining the authority of the High Courts or/and
simply as a presentation of his new gained power49. 
 
Conclusions
31 By approaching the question of legitimacy from an empirical understanding, using claims
and the acceptance of claims as an analytical tool, I aimed to demonstrate that legitimacy
of  political  representation  is  not  mainly  the  result  of  the  static  fact  of  elections  –
legitimacy could rather be understood as  acceptance of  people and groups,  which is
changing over time and can be institutionalized in different ways, depending on current
political discourses. 
32 The ways claims are brought forward depends on the prevalent discourses: A claim will be
more successful when it refers to a certain argument or stream within a discourse that
seems to have the support or the acceptance of most of the people and groups. Claims can
be raised from “real” groups, like the Salafis. In fact, they became a collective by raising a
claim and henceforth needed to be considered as a serious political player. But collectives
can also be created through a discourse itself, like the fulul – none claimed to be a fulul. It
is important to note that both groups (as well as the shabab al-thaura or the baltageya) are
incorporated into a  general  discourse and became “discursive collectives” or  “empty
signifiers”, through which the discourse changes. The fulul discourse enabled people to
discuss what is  good and bad for a society – the fulul  as symbol  for the old regime,
associated  with  corruption and oppression versus  the  shabab  al-thaura  as  symbol  for
freedom of expression and purity. The appearance of the Salafis as a collective changed
the discourse about the role and the limits of Islam in politics. It was demonstrated how
different parties referred to these discourses and how they used them to gain acceptance
from the people. Raising claims is therefore not only a symbolical struggle of political
groups in order to gain acceptance of the people – they change the ways people reflects
on their society and consequently how they perceive themselves – this changes not only
their decision whom to elect, what and whom to accept, but also influences their all-day
routine in dealing with other people. 
33 The example of the change in the election law clearly shows that claims can turn into
fundamentally  important  political  decisions  concerning  “legitimacy”  itself,  when  the
claim is supported through a discourse that most of the people seem to share, i.e.  to
accept. There might have been other strategic reasons for the political groups to demand
the change of the election law, but by referring to the danger of the fulul, they could
successfully  enforce  their  claim.  In  comparison  to  most  states  of  Europe,  in  Egypt
institutions like the High Court and the institutions that decide over laws also have to
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raise claims in order to appear legitimate – they actively have to create the fiction of
legitimacy. In Europe they only have to keep their status. 
34 Focussing on the making of legitimacy from an empirical perspective seems very complex
and challenging. In this paper I could provide only a few examples of how parties and
groups frame their claims and how they were accepted or negotiated. One could question
the  representativeness  of  the  given  examples,  chosen  frames  and  groups.  Other
important  considerations  were  not  discussed,  like  the  ways,  how  people  gain  their
information that influences their opinions about claims. 
35 However, important insights could be won: Firstly, the making of legitimacy turns out to
be a highly sensitive, fluid and often paradoxical process. Secondly, by analysing how the
discourses or frames of claims change, a deeper understanding of the political culture can
be developed. As it is hard to foresee coming events, this understanding seems to be the
only  ground  on  which  one  can  make  sense  of  events.  It  is  important  to  note,  that
discourses  are  also  influencing the  ways,  how events  are  post-rationalized.  The first
weeks after the parliamentary elections the elections and procedures could be read as a
story of success: High turnout of voters, apparently free and fair etc. This presented story
of success completely ignores that the day before the elections none knew, if they will
take place at all. Thirdly, every group or person, elected or not, can make claims, can gain
acceptance and can therefore be political influential. 
36 Using an empirical-driven approach entails a danger though: It makes it hard to set up
normative standards to which the actual political system can be compared. On the other
hand these normative standards were mainly developed in a certain context (mainly
Europe) at a certain time in order to foster democratization, since the main question was:
How should a democracy look like? Political and cultural conditions were incorporated in
these normative theories without explicit  reflection on it.  In order to enable a more
critical perspective on political systems, whether they are considered as democracies or
not, theories on political representation now need to focus more on the practices of a
state: Informal structures and persons and groups that might not have a position in the
democratic system can be very influential even in “modern democracies”. 
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1. The provided data for this analysis are the result of a field research started in June 2011
and is still ongoing until December 2013. 200 semi-structured, in-depth interviews and
discussions  lasting from 15 minutes  to  three hours  were conducted mainly  in  Cairo,
Bahariya, Mahalla al-Kubra and Luxor. The interview partners are from various social
layers  (e.g.  students,  bedouins)  and  were  chosen  along  criteria  like  educated/not-
edcuated,  male/female,  religious/not-religious,  Copt/Muslim,  city/countryside,
supporter of  the revolution/supporter of  the old system etc.).  With 15 fixed persons
interviews were conducted several times during the research period. In the paper all
names of interview partners are changed. The chosen quotes are representing narratives
that appeared in different interviews several times. 
2. The Democratic Coalition consisted of groups from different political parties as the
Freedom and Justice Party and the liberal Wafd Party.
3. Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Decree-Law 123/2011
4. like the Democratic Coalition and the Tagammu Party, see: International Foundation
for Electoral Systems (IFES) 01.11.2011, p. 3
5. Ahram Daily online 1.10.2011, Egypt military rulers agree to amend election law
6. Ahram Weekly online 13.-10.10.2011, Political row over religious slogans
7. Carter Center 24.01.2012, p.1
8. Aljazeera English online 14.06.2012, Egypt court orders dissolving of parliament
9. Hossam Bahgat, a human rights activist, stated: “Egypt just witnessed the smoothest
military coup. We'd be outraged if we weren't so exhausted”. (See: BBC News Middle East
online 14.06.2012, In quotes: Egypt court rulings reaction)
10. Hanna Pitkin, who was shaping and influencing theories on political representation
over decades, stated in a speech on the occasion of her retirement as professor in 2004:
“Like most people even today; I more or less equated democracy with representation or at
least with representative government”, 2004, p. 336.
11. Theories that equate political representation and democratic representation usually
set up a list  of  normative criteria in order to assess the democratic stage a political
systems is in, like free and fair elections, strong civil society, gender equality and so on. In
fact this equation is a very modern phenomenon: “Only in the English Civil War and then
in the eighteenth-century democratic revolutions did the two concepts become linked”,
Pitkin  2004,  p. 335.  The  theories  were  developed  mainly  in  Europe  in  a  context  of
democratization  and  the  main  question  that  people  were  concerned  with  was:  How
should  a  democracy  look  like?  Consequently,  normative  criteria  to  measure  the
democratization process were developed. The crisis of political representation theories
then  mainly  occurred  in  a  context  in  which  more  and  more  non-democratic
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representative institutions and NGOs appeared in the global field. (Rehfeld 2006, p. 1) Also
the  building  of  political  supra-institutions  within  the  European  Union,  which  are
criticized as not being representative due to the lack of electoral structures and for other
reasons, strengthened the doubts about the normative approaches, since they did not
include informal structures or the influence of not-elected institutions and organizations.
Mair 2010,  p.  20-35,  Especially the democratic elections of the Hamas in 2006,  whose
outcome was highly discussed and not accepted from different countries, Bjornlund 2007,
p. 122, started a process of rethinking the meaning of legitimate political representation.
I would also argue that a trigger for the slow turn from normative driven theories to
empirical driven theories was the emerge of self-reflection about the meaning of cultural
values, fostered by the discussions after the attacks on the 11th September 2001 in New
York and publications like Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”.
12. Saward defines a claim as follows: “Some individual or collective agent constructs or
makes the claim – a ‘maker’. And the thing represented is an idea of it, not the thing itself,
which is better called a ‘referent’ (if the politician makes himself the ‘subject’ who stands
for an ‘object,’ the object is his idea of his constituency rather than the referent, which is
all  the other things the constituency is,  or  might be).  All  of  this  needs,  and has,  an
‘audience,’ which receives the claims and accepts, rejects, or ignores them”, 2010, p. 36.
13. Schwartz  states,  that  “political  representation  can  be  conceived  as  an  ongoing
founding, as the constitution of community”, stressing the idea that representation has to
be understood as set of practices and events, and not as “making something present” as
many theorists have asserted, 1988, p. 53.
14. Rehfeld 2006, p. 2
15. Saward 2010, p. 2
16. Following  Max Weber  acceptance  in  this  context  is  understood as  ‘will  to  obey’
“Gehorchen wollen”, see: Weber 1980, p. 122
17. Jadaliyya online 16.11.2011, Egypt Elections Watch: Use with Caution, p. 3 
18. Jadaliyya online 16.11.2011, Egypt Elections Watch: Use with Caution, p. 3 
19. Forbes online 03.10.2010, The World's Billionaires: #374 Naguib Sawiris
20. Own observations
21. www.emsekflol.com: Youth of 6 April, the Movement to Apprehend the Remnants, the
Alliance of Youth of the Revolution, the Movement of Youth for Justice and Freedom, the
National  Center  of  Popular  Councils;  see:  Tahrir  Documents  02.11.2011,  Capture  the
Remnants: The Black List.
22. Interview conducted on the 19.11.2011 in the museum of Anwar Sadat, Mit Abu al-
Kum, Nile Delta
23. A very strong tool from the parties to present themselves a anti-fulul was to claim to
represent the shabab al thaura, the youth of the revolution, which is considered as the
driving force of the revolution and therefore as being good and pure. Every party stated
to  have  shabab  al-thaura amongst  their  members.  This  strategy  allowed  them  to
incorporate the positive values the shabab al-thaura was associated with. 
24. The Daily Star online 02.10.2011, Egypt parties to review army vote concessions
25. International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 01.11.2011, p. 3
26. Egypt Independent online 17.06.2012,  SCAF expands its  power with constitutional
amendments
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27. Al-Masry al-Youm online 29.07.2011, Tahrir updates: 28 secular parties and coalitions
pulling out from square, and: Egypt Independent online 02.08.2011, After show of force,
Islamists debate role of religion in politics
28. Several of my informants made exactly the same statement.
29. El-Mahdi, 11.4.2011, Orientalising the Egyptian Uprising
30. Also see: Ahram Daily online 01.11.2011, Reconstructing 's Bloody Sunday: al-Ahram
online investigation
31. Al-Masry al-Youm , 06.11.2012, Elections campaigning played out in Eid
32. Reuters 09.10.2011, Egypt generals ban using religious slogans in vote
33. Ahram Weekly online 13.-10.10.2011, Political row over religious slogans
34. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 21.09.2011, Al-Masriyeen al-Ahrrar, Free
Egyptians Party
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36. The  interview  was  conducted  at  the  first  day  of  the  parliamentary  elections,
28.11.2011, in front of a polling station in Downtown, Cairo.
37. Ahram Daily online18.11.2011,  Live Updates:  Egypt's  'Friday of  One Demand'  as  it
unfold
38. Draft Declaration of the Fundamental Principles for the New Egyptian State, 11.2011
39. Daily News Egypt online18.11.2011, Thousands rally in Tahrir on Friday of 'Protecting
Democracy'
40. The Egyptian Gazette online 27.11.2011, Egypt braces for protests on eve of elections
41. Interview was conducted in the afternoon of the 24.11.2011, near Midan al-Tahrir
42. Interview was conducted in the morning of the 24.11.2011, Zamalek 
43. Carnegie Endowment for International  Peace online 02.11.2011,  Istikmal  al-Thawra,
Completing the Revolution Alliance
44. Al-Masry  al-Youm  online  25.10.2011,  The  Revolution  Continues  Coalition  hits  the
ground running
45. Ahram online 20.11.2011, Several political figures and coalitions boycott campaigning
after police crackdown in Tahrir
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ABSTRACTS
In  times  of  transformation  and extreme fluidity  in  which  the  sources  of  legitimate  political
representation  like  elections,  constitutions  etc.  are  contested,  alternative  theoretical
understandings  of  political  representation  and  legitimacy  need  to  be  developed  in  order  to
explain  change.  Starting  from the  assumption  that  elections  are  only  a  snapshot  that  show
acceptance at a certain moment, the article explores the making and the reception of claims
during the parliamentary elections 2011/12 in Egypt. The following questions are raised: How
can  we  think  about  legitimate  political  representation  for  a  better  understanding  of  the
transformation process in Egypt? How can we explain the changes and developments concerning
political  representation  during  the  parliamentary  elections  2011?  The  provided  data  are  the
result of a field research started in December 2010 containing in-depth interviews with a wide
range of actors.
À une époque de grandes transformations durant lesquelles les sources habituelles de légitimité
telles  que  les  élections,  les  constitutions,  etc.  sont  contestées,  le  besoin  se  fait  sentir  de
développer  de  nouvelles  théories  de  la  représentation  politique  et  de  la  légitimité  pour
comprendre et expliquer le changement.  Partant du postulat que les élections ne sont qu’un
instantané  montrant  ce  qui  est  accepté  à  un  moment  donné,  cet  article  s’intéresse  à  la
formulation et à la réception des revendications pendant les élections législatives égyptiennes de
2011-2012.  Les  questions  suivantes  sont  examinées :  Comment  pouvons-nous  penser  la
représentation politique légitime afin de mieux comprendre le processus de transformation en
cours  en Égypte ?  Comment  expliquer  les  changements  et  les  développements  concernant  la
représentation politique durant ces élections ? Les données examinées ont été recueillies durant
un travail de terrain débuté en décembre 2010, au cours duquel nous avons réalisé des entretiens
approfondis avec une grande variété d’acteurs.
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